A fundamentally important means of protecting the care recipient's home (and a co-resident's ability to continue living in it) at the financial assessment stage must be appreciated. This is the fact that a home can in many cases be excluded from a local authority's assessment of the care recipient's capital in the first place. If an adult care recipient is to receive non-residential care in her own home, assessment of her capital must exclude her main or only home. 22 Even if the care recipient is to receive residential care in a care home, the very presence of some of the co-residents with whom this chapter is concerned can prevent a home from being included in the local authority's assessment from the outset, meaning that the care recipient will be assessed as though she did not have an interest in it for these purposes. There is a mandatory 'disregard' not only if the care recipient is in a care home temporarily and intends to return to the main home or is taking reasonable steps to dispose of it, but also if the main home is occupied by a non-estranged partner, a single parent who is an estranged partner, or a relative namely 'to ensure that [care home] residents with assets are not maintained at public expense '. 27 Cases where a relative moves into the property only after the adult has become resident in a care home are included in the scope of the discretionary disregard. When the Court of Appeal considered the pre-Act disregard relating to occupation of a care recipient's home by family members in Walford v Worcestershire County Council, Underhill LJ noted that the new regulations 'deal more explicitly with the issue' than the old ones. 28 There is also a 12-week disregard of the value of the home when the adult first enters a care home or another disregard ends unexpectedly because a qualifying relative dies or goes into a care home himself. 29 There is a discretion to disregard in relation to other unexpected changes of circumstance.
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As discussed in Section III, a deferred payment agreement is unlikely to be offered where a care recipient has been assessed as liable to contribute towards care costs and has relevant property other than the main home. This, in turn, means that where a home is disregarded, it is unlikely to be subject to a DPA, a state of affairs likely to benefit co-residents. There may nevertheless be circumstances where arrears of care fees have accumulated (perhaps at the time of death) and the home is sold in order to meet the debts of the estate without reference to a DPA or even where a home was disregarded in the initial financial assessment. The enforcement of debts is considered in Section IV of this chapter.
Even if a home is not formally disregarded, the value of a non-care recipient's share of it in principle should not be included in the financial assessment, 31 and it may be difficult for a local authority to justify taking even the care recipient's share in the home into account where someone else has an interest in it given that '[t] others are beneficially entitled to capital 'each person is to be treated as if each of them were entitled in possession to an equal share of the whole beneficial interest'. 33 If the care recipient deliberately alienates part of the beneficial interest in order to avoid liability for care fees, however, this is likely to trigger the Care Act's anti-avoidance provisions, which allow a local authority to treat her as though she still owned it (subject to the market value issue just considered) or to pursue the disponee for a relevant amount. 34 Moreover, it will be seen in Section III that where the presence of a co-resident has not prevented the offering of, and entry into, a DPA, the notion of priority for the purposes of the DPA regulations might prejudice the protection apparently given to a co-resident's share.
This sub-section has demonstrated that there are a number of circumstances in which the sale of a home forced by a local authority will not in principle become a realistic prospect because of the existence of a co-resident. These circumstances are notably peculiar to the liability to pay for social care, and are advantageous to such co-residents as compared to (perhaps more familiar) situations involving private-sector creditors. There will nevertheless be cases where a home sale at the behest of a local authority would be possible and could prejudice the interests of a former co-resident, and the remainder of this chapter deals with these. allowed a charge to be placed on the home 42 but did not require consent. 43 The Court of Appeal in Walford was told that in a case where a resident owns property which is not the subject of a disregard but has no significant income it is standard practice for authorities to take such a charge, though they may choose not to seek to enforce it forthwith.
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This ability to create a charge unilaterally was detrimental to both care recipients and coresidents, albeit that, as the Land Registry put it, '[w]here the [care home] resident is a joint owner, the charge affects only his or her beneficial interest, not the registered legal estate', and 'section 22(5) provides that the joint tenancy is not severed, but the charge will be for an amount not exceeding the value of the interest which the resident would enjoy if the tenancy were severed'. 45 Section 69 of the 2014 Act, which addresses debt recovery, does not contain an express power to create such a charge, which is beneficial to both care recipients and coresidents, albeit that matters may be different to the situation described by the Land Registry where a charge has been imposed by consent under a DPA. The Act does leave open the possibility of 'alternative financial arrangements' to DPAs, but the section providing for them is not in force at the time of writing. 46 The details of the new DPA scheme, and its implications for co-residents, are considered in the next sub-section of this chapter.
B. Deferred Payment Agreements under the Care Act 2014
The government reported that '[t]he majority of respondents' to its consultation exercise were 'highly supportive of the overall intention to extend the deferred payments scheme' under the 42 Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983, s 22. 2014 Act. 47 The new DPA scheme is designed to be cost-neutral, such that interest rates and administration charges can be levied. There is a national maximum interest rate specified in a circular, and the guidance suggests a given local authority must use the same rate for all of its DPAs.
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On particular issues, 'some [consultation] respondents suggested that the guidance needed to provide further clarity around how to manage issues associated with lack of mental capacity'.
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There were concerns about 'people entering into deferred payment agreements … inappropriately when they lacked capacity, and what might happen if people lost capacity whilst in DPAs'. 50 It was also noted that A number of consultees also pointed out that, given that DPAs may be relatively brief in length, people should be provided with statements of the amount deferred at more frequent intervals, and should be able to request statements as and when they were needed 51 and '[s]ome respondents also suggested that the guidance should be clearer that local authorities should signpost people to independent financial advice (including regulated financial advice but only where appropriate) [52] when considering taking out a DPA'. 53 The guidance was amended to reflect all of these concerns. The guidelines on the equity limit (explained below) have also been simplified. While 'the majority of respondents were supportive of the suggestion to incentivise rental by allowing people to retain a proportion of any income they generated from letting their property', 54 this will not always be feasible where A local authority may refuse to defer further costs under an existing agreement (as the amount actually spent on care increases) where the person's assets fall below the threshold or become disregarded such that the person becomes eligible for mean-tested help, the person no longer needs care in a care home or the person has committed a non-resolved breach of the agreement and the agreement permits a refusal to defer further. 68 Oddly, the situation where the person no longer needs support in a care home appears in both the discretionary and mandatory refusal categories.
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The guidance also states that a local authority should not exercise its discretion to refuse further deferrals where the person would be unable to pay any liability that became due as a result from their non-housing assets, 70 but it must refuse further deferrals where a person has reached their 'equity limit', with such refusal presumably prompting immediate sale (prejudicial to former co-residents) in some cases. This limit on the amount that can be deferred is effectively determined by the amount of equity the person has in the chosen security (usually the home), on sale. The difficulties of valuing and including a care recipient's share where a co-owner also has a beneficial interest must, however, be taken into account.
If a local authority fails to gain consent from a former co-resident, it is presumably at risk of its charge ranking below any beneficial interest of that co-resident (provided that the interest is overriding 82 and has not been overreached), 83 and being subject to proceedings under the that the co-resident knew that care was required, that it prima facie had to be paid for and that a charge on the home as part of a DPA was the only means by which this could be achieved without selling the home.
The undue influence doctrine is presumably another means through which a local authority can lose priority to a former co-resident with a beneficial interest, specifically one who has purported to consent to a DPA in the face of pressure from a would-be care recipient who emphasises the lack of realistic alternatives. 87 The local authority is likely to be put on inquiry in respect of such influence being exerted by a care recipient, since it is unlikely that a care recipient and a co-resident would be considered to be receiving the loan for their joint benefit.
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It may be arguable, however, that the co-resident is receiving indirect benefit for the loan, particularly if he is being relieved of informal caring responsibilities through the provision of formal social care. In any event, a would-be care recipient may be more readily considered a potential victim of undue influence rather than a potential perpetrator.
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The statutory guidance on the Care Act was amended inter alia to ensure that local authorities 'signpost' people to independent financial advice (including regulated financial advice) where appropriate before taking out a DPA. 90 The facilitation of access to independent financial advice is included within a local authority's information and advice-related obligations under section 4 of the Act, though there are concerns that the advice-related duty is a general duty that does not seek to ensure that advice is received and understood, 91 and the focus is likely to be on the care recipient rather than any co-resident. The statutory guidance simply states that if, after the 90-day period following death of a care recipient where a DPA is in place, a local authority concludes active steps to repay the debt are not being taken, for example if the sale is not progressing and a local authority has actively sought to resolve the situation (or the local authority concludes the executor is wilfully obstructing sale of the property), the local authority may enter into legal proceedings to reclaim the amount due to it in accordance with the general debt recovery provisions in section 69 of the Act and Annex D of the guidance.
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The preference given to a charge by way of legal mortgage presumably means that the statutory provisions usually governing such mortgages will potentially apply to many DPAs. This would include, for example, the restrictions on the exercise of a power of sale if the care recipient were still alive under the Law of Property Act 1925, 150 meaning that some interest under the mortgage must be in arrears and have been unpaid for two months after becoming due, three months must have elapsed since notice requiring payment of the mortgage money was served on at least one mortgagor (which may not be relevant where the care recipient has died) or there must have been some breach of a non-payment covenant by the mortgagor or someone who agreed to the mortgage.
If the care recipient has died (as many will have done by the time a DPA comes to be enforced) and the former co-resident lacked a pre-existing beneficial interest in the property, the home would fairly routinely be sold in the context of the personal representatives' duty to pay the debts of the estate. 151 This would be true even if the former co-resident is prima facie entitled to inherit the relevant home under a will or the intestacy rules, particularly since it is thought that he would possess only a chose in action to compel due administration of the estate until that administration is complete. imposes a presumption that secured debts should be paid out of the asset over which the security exists where it has been bequeathed by will. The section expressly provides that the rights of the chargee will be unaffected by the presumption, 153 which means that the local authority would retain a power of sale contained in a DPA.
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Such a sale also seems inevitable on death of the care recipient where the former co-resident did have a pre-existing proprietary interest but was bound by the local authority's charge, unless the former co-resident is able to discharge the relevant debt himself and the local authority consents to his doing so. even where a public body is the proprietor of a charge over a home and seeks to enforce it, it may be difficult for a former co-resident to argue that the interference with his Article 8 right to respect for his home is disproportionate. 166 Even so, while it may be legally permissible as a matter of general mortgage law for a mortgagee to exercise its power of sale without first obtaining a court order for possession, 167 this may not be an appropriate action for a local authority to take where it is opposed by a former co-resident.
Where there is no DPA or pre-existing charge on the care recipient's former home, a charging order (governed by the Charging Orders Act 1979) 168 is likely to be possible in order to enforce the debt owed to a local authority. 169 In proceedings concerning a charging order, a former coresident may benefit from the fact that a local authority did not initially have a security interest in the care recipient's home. As Dixon notes, however, even in this context 'there remains a steady preference in favour of a sale against the wishes of the innocent co-owner'.
V. Conclusion
The law considered in this chapter is a relatively complex mixture of specific social care provisions, general public law principles and the general law of mortgages. In all likelihood, 'former co-residents' of a social care recipient will generally be in a stronger position than former co-residents of other types of debtors when it comes to the sale of the care recipient's former home, even if some of them have made contributions (in principle voluntarily) to the care recipient's care costs to increase the available standard of care. They will often benefit from protection before the loan arrangement is even entered through the 'disregard' system (even if they lack an entitlement relating to the home altogether), and the system is designed (subject to issues of 'priority' under a DPA) to ensure that they are not personally liable to pay for the care recipient's care. This is a highly distinctive feature of the regulation of security interests in the social care context, since it means that the former co-resident can be heavily protected while the would-be mortgagor is often able to obtain substantially the same benefit (ie the care) regardless of whether the charge is created.
Moreover, deferred payment agreements are relatively heavily regulated, and the status of the local authority as a public body in principle produces additional and justifiable safeguards, even if a former co-resident may find himself reliant on the benevolent exercise of discretion by a local authority. The removal of the local authority's power unilaterally to create a charge over the home (effectively meaning that only a charging order is likely to produce a security interest where there is no deferred payment agreement) is also welcome.
It may appear unfortunate for former co-residents still to be able to lose their homes, and care recipients relatively routinely to be deprived of their full testamentary freedom, in the manner facilitated even by the reformed social care system. This is particularly true if the cap on care costs is never implemented and the misfortune is ultimately caused by the policy choice to apply a means test for social care. It is noteworthy, moreover, that in an empirical study on public opinion surrounding the intestacy rules, 'participants felt strongly that the family home should always, initially at least, go to the surviving spouse or cohabiting partner or any relative, friend or companion who might be made homeless by any other arrangement'. 171 As I have argued elsewhere, however, any reduction in the resources going into the care system may prejudice its ability to cater for those who are genuinely unable to make a contribution towards their own care costs.
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